A two-stage joint inventory and pricing game with capacity commitment

dc.contributor	Graduate Program in Industrial Engineering.
dc.contributor.advisor	Bilgiç, Taner,
dc.contributor.author	Bayramoğlu, Sezin.
dc.date.accessioned	2023-03-16T10:29:05Z
dc.date.available	2023-03-16T10:29:05Z
dc.date.issued	2016.
dc.identifier.other	IE 2016 B38
dc.identifier.uri	http://digitalarchive.boun.edu.tr/handle/123456789/13360
dc.description.abstract	In this thesis a two-stage capacity, inventory, and pricing game is studied. Two competing vendors make a capacity commitment to invest in the rst stage. This capacity limits how much they can produce in order to meet random demand in the second stage, where they decide on quantities and prices simultaneously. The equilibria are analyzed for both stages of the game. The interaction between rst stage capacity decisions and second stage joint quantity-pricing decisions is explored. The recommended pricing policies are determined for both players. A computational method is pursued in the numerical analysis of how the rst stage capacity decisions impact the second stage equilibria.
dc.format.extent	30 cm.
dc.publisher	Thesis (M.S.)-Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in Science and Engineering, 2016.
dc.subject.lcsh	Production planning -- Data processing.
dc.subject.lcsh	Inventory control -- Mathematical models.
dc.title	A two-stage joint inventory and pricing game with capacity commitment
dc.format.pages	xi, 30 leaves ;