Problems of self-knowledge and phenomenal character

Abstract

Self-knowledge regarding sincere attributions about mental states, bodily sensations, perceptions, and the phenomenal character of experiences seem direct and true. However, the questions of how we acquire such knowledge and whether it is always reliable are significant in understanding more about ourselves. This is a study that revolves around the notions of consciousness, awareness, perception, introspection and the phenomenal character of one’s own experiences. It is an attempt to present several important questions about self-knowledge. The study starts with an inquiry on Fred Dretske’s question of how we know that we are not zombies and leads to an exposition and evaluation of two models of introspection called the displaced perception model and the inner-sense model. It follows with an attempt to understand the notion of phenomenal character of experience by evaluating two accounts held by Thomas Nagel and Peter Hacker. Although there are problems with the accounts of self-knowledge presented throughout the study, self-knowledge of mental states, physical sensations, and the phenomenal character of experience seems to be a cognitive achievement. This study concludes with the claim that both trivial self-knowledge and substantial self knowledge are significant in understanding ourselves and they should be taken up together.