On the identity of emotions: concepts, feelings, and intentionality

dc.contributor	Graduate Program in Philosophy.
dc.contributor.advisor	Voss, Stephen,
dc.contributor.author	Dolun, Botan.
dc.date.accessioned	2023-03-16T11:55:16Z
dc.date.available	2023-03-16T11:55:16Z
dc.date.issued	2009.
dc.identifier.other	PHIL 2009 D65
dc.identifier.uri	http://digitalarchive.boun.edu.tr/handle/123456789/16206
dc.description.abstract	Historically, the philosophy of emotion deals with the question of what emotions are and how they relate to other types of mental states. This thesis gives an answer to this question in two consecutive steps. First, we circumvent the problem of intentionality by making a clear distinction between emotions and emotional feelings. Secondly, an understanding of the fundamental relationship between emotions and value judgements is sought, so that we can come up with a system of classification which applies to all emotion types.
dc.format.extent	30cm.
dc.publisher	Thesis (M.A.)-Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences, 2009.
dc.subject.lcsh	Emotions (Philosophy)
dc.subject.lcsh	Intentionality (Philosophy)
dc.title	On the identity of emotions: concepts, feelings, and intentionality
dc.format.pages	vi, 48 leaves;