Do incomplete definite descriptions refute Russell’s theory of descriptions?

Abstract

The aim of this study is to formulate a Russellian solution to the problem of incomplete definite descriptions, and thereby defend Russell’s Theory of Descriptions. To this end, I argue that the proper way to approach the problem is to treat the Theory of Descriptions not merely as a semantic theory, but to view it in light of Russell’s epistemology and theory of thought. I discuss several solutions proposed in the literature that either deny Russell’s semantics altogether, or ignore his epistemological framework while trying to save his semantics. I reject those solutions as unsuitable for explaining the use of incomplete definite descriptions in ordinary discourse. Russell’s distinction between acquaintance and knowledge about an object is set as the main axis of this thesis. In conformity with Russell’s theory of thought, I claim that all kinds of singular terms, including incomplete definite descriptions, are to be treated similarly, because in each case a speaker using a singular term intends to express her thought about an external object. Thus, the alleged problems with respect to the use of incomplete definite descriptions are to be found in all kinds of singular terms. As a result of these observations, I employ a version of Searle’s Cluster Theory for proper names in order to give a full account of the proposition expressed by a sentence containing an incomplete definite description, and I resolve the problem of incomplete definite descriptions within Russell’s Theory of Descriptions.