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dc.contributor Graduate Program in Philosophy.
dc.contributor.advisor İnan, İlhan.
dc.contributor.author Yavuz, Alper.
dc.date.accessioned 2023-03-16T11:55:22Z
dc.date.available 2023-03-16T11:55:22Z
dc.date.issued 2012.
dc.identifier.other PHIL 2012 Y38
dc.identifier.uri http://digitalarchive.boun.edu.tr/handle/123456789/16226
dc.description.abstract The aim of this thesis is to discuss whether general terms are rigid and if they are, how their rigidity should be interpreted. To this end, I first present the problems related to the rigidity of general terms. The most important ones among them are the following: What do general terms refer to? Is there any difference between the terms called “natural kind terms” and other general terms? After that, I discuss the arguments of three competent interpretations which try to overcome these problems. The first interpretation holds that general terms refer to (or apply to) each and every object in their extensions. According to this view, only general terms related to essential properties like “cat”, “gold” turn out to be rigid. After I try to expose the drawbacks of this view, I examine the arguments of the second interpretation which holds that general terms refer to abstract kinds. I also argue for this interpretation. According to this interpretation general terms which refer to the same kind in all possible worlds turn out to be rigid. The main objection to this view is that this interpretation makes so many general terms rigid and it trivializes the notion of rigidity. Arguing that this is an unfair objection, I also focus on the philosophical importance of the subject and show that the interpretation I argue for realizes this philosophical importance. The third interpretation, on the other hand, rejects the rigidity of general terms. I also discuss the drawbacks of this view. Another subject I discuss in the thesis is the rigidity of artifactual kind terms. The kinds of human made objects for specific purposes are usually called “artifactual kinds”. I argue that artifactual kind terms could rigidly refer to artifactual kinds. I reply to the critiques of this view with regard to the semantics of artifactual kind terms and metaphysics of artifactual kinds.
dc.format.extent 30 cm.
dc.publisher Thesis (M.A.) - Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences, 2012.
dc.relation Includes appendices.
dc.relation Includes appendices.
dc.subject.lcsh Language and languages -- Philosophy.
dc.title On the rigidity of general terms
dc.format.pages viii, 87 leaves ;


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