Kant‘s conception of conscience and reflexive judgment

Abstract

This dissertation consists of an explanation and interpretation of Kant‘s concept of conscience. By a detailed examination of Kant‘s Critical writings, I aim to show what roles the concept of conscience plays in his moral theory. This requires analyzing certain moral and cognitive concepts and principles as they relate to the phenomenon of conscience. Kant‘s account of rational judgment, especially in its reflexive aspect, is of vital importance for this project, as is his conception of the moral law, freedom of the will and our form of sensibly affected rational agency. After a general overview of Kant‘s philosophy which explains these concepts, I look at two important sources in order to reconstruct Kant‘s conception of conscience: the Lecture Notes on Ethics and the Metaphysics of Morals. Afterwards, I focus on issues that are related to our everyday understanding of the conscience, such as religious convictions, personal integrity, moral imputation and sincerity. The culmination of the dissertation consists in a discussion of Kant‘s ideas on moral education and how conscience could be cultivated. The literature on Kant‘s conception of conscience has not explored its intricate relations with sensibility, reflexive judgment and religion. My thesis is an attempt to fill this gap. The elaboration of the concept of conscience, along with the explication of the concept of moral character, can bring together Kant‘s various text on moral philosophy into a systematic unity, which would be attuned to a comprehensive moral education.